ANTICOMPETITIVE ASPECTS OF INTER- AND INTRAPLATFORM LEVERAGING

The book investigates the concept of platform as a market player and identifies specific platforms’ characteristics that make it practical from the competition law enforcement point of view to distinguish between leveraging practices that extend a market power from one platform to another and ones that are implemented to the same effect between the two sides of the same platform. The book finds that differential treatment by competition law enforcement is justified as soon as the type of connection between the markets is taken into account. To prove this point the book juxtaposes the abusive behaviour in Google (Shopping) and Google (Android) cases that resemble each other in any way other than the type of connection between the markets involved. By matching the elements of the conduct with the full range of available formal tests developed in the settled case law on market power leveraging the book demonstrates the weaknesses of various formal classifications of the behaviour in question under art. 102 TFEU highlighting the edges of the associated enforcement gap. The book argues that the latter can be effectively tackled by incorporating the analysis of the connections between the relevant markets into the formal leveraging tests. It further outlines three main routes the CJEU may take to implement the change. 

Contents

Acknowledgements

Keywords

Chapter 1. Introduction

1.1. The context

1.2. Research question and methodology 

1.3. Scope and structure 

Chapter II. The concept of platforms 

2.1. The concept 

2.2. Network effects 

2.2.1. Research on network effects 

2.2.2. Types of network effects 

2.3. Cross-subsidization 

2.3.1. Price structure 

2.3.2. Zero-price trade 

2.3.2.1. Zero-price trade and the scope of competition law 

2.3.2.1.1. Information costs 

2.3.2.1.2. Attention costs 

2.3.3. Platforms’ dynamics 

2.3.4. Multi-homing 

2.3.5. Platforms as a matter of degree 

2.4. Conclusion on platforms 

Chapter III. Leveraging 

3.1. The concept 

3.1.1. Origin of the concept 

3.1.2. Leveraging as a prohibited strategy under Art. 102 TFEU 

3.1.3. Comparison of the US and EU approaches 

3.1.3.1 Quantifiable nature of competition 

3.1.3.2. Probabilistic approach: likeliness, likelihood, and capability 

3.1.3.3. Role of intent 

3.1.3.4. Conclusion on comparison 

3.2. Elements of abusive leveraging 

3.2.1. Multiple markets and connections between them 

3.2.1.1. Tying 

3.2.1.2. Rebates, exclusive dealing, predatory pricing 

3.2.1.3. Refusal to supply, margin squeeze 

3.2.1.4. Conclusion on elements 

3.3. Qualification of leveraging under Art. 102 TFEU 

3.3.1. Standards based on demand manipulation 

3.3.2. Standards based on supply inhibition 

3.3.3. Leveraging practices in and out of the reach of Art. 102 TFEU 

3.3.4. Possible solutions 

3.4. Conclusion on leveraging 

Chapter IV. Inter- and intraplatforms leveraging within Art. 102 TFEU 

4.1. Google (Shopping) 

4.1.1. The setup 

4.1.2. The Commission’s approach to classification of conduct 

4.1.3. Google’s conduct as horizontal market power leveraging 

4.1.3.1. Exclusionary tying 

4.1.3.2. Exploitative tying 

4.1.4. Google’s conduct as vertical market power leveraging 

4.1.4.1. Classification 

4.1.4.1.1. Ranking 

4.1.4.1.2. Shopping Unit 

4.1.4.1.3. The Bronner standard applicability 

4.1.4.1.4. Application of the formal test 

4.1.4.1.4.1. User traffic as the input 

4.1.4.1.4.2. Traffic generated by Google general search as the input 

4.1.4.1.4.3. Traffic generated by Google Shopping Unit as the input 

4.1.4.2. Conclusion on the classification of the conduct as vertical leveraging 

4.1.4.3. Justification of the contested conduct 

4.2. Google (Android) 

4.2.1. The setup 

4.2.2. Qualification 

4.2.2.1. Illegal tying of Google’s search and browser apps

4.2.2.2. Illegal payments conditional on exclusive pre-installation of Google Search

4.2.2.3. Illegal obstruction of development and distribution of competing Android operating systems 

4.3. Conclusion on Google Decisions 

Chapter V. Conclusion 

Bibliography